Judicial Logic: Its Rules and Limits
Abstract
This study investigates the rules and limits of judicial logic, emphasizing how courts navigate between strict legal reasoning and ethical considerations. When legal texts are clear, judges apply logical and quasi-logical rules; but when texts are ambiguous or silent, they shift toward equitable reasoning, drawing upon ethical principles to resolve disputes. The limits of judicial logic emerge when cognitive and psychological biases distort reasoning, undermining the judiciary’s role as protector of rights and security, as well as when legal education neglects training in logical methods. By analyzing both the rules (Section I) and limits (Section II), the research highlights the complementary relationship between legal and ethical reasoning, while also exposing the detrimental effects of bias and insufficient logical training on judicial practice. It concludes with recommendations to reform legal education to strengthen logical thinking and to raise awareness of cognitive biases and strategies to mitigate them, thereby enhancing the soundness and integrity of judicial reasoning.
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