The Phenomenological Method between Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger

Abstract

This study seeks to clarify certain ambiguities surrounding phenomenology, particularly regarding the widespread assumption that Heidegger’s role in philosophical history is rooted in his association with the Husserlian school. However, his engagement with Husserl was methodological rather than doctrinal. Heidegger did not aim to resolve the philosophical dilemmas that hindered Husserl or to complete the phenomenological project. Instead, he sought to establish a distinct intellectual trajectory—one that appropriated phenomenological method solely to recover and revitalize inquiry into the long-neglected question of being. This motivation underpins the structure of the study, which comprises an introduction and three chapters. The first examines Heidegger’s view of the history of philosophy as a deviation from its foundational concern—the quest for the truth of being. The second chapter addresses his critique of Husserl, whom he saw as contributing to this deviation. The final chapter explores Heidegger’s implementation of the phenomenological method as a novel framework for interpreting human existence. The study concluded that Heidegger’s phenomenological approach became intertwined with hermeneutics, ultimately giving rise to a distinct orientation known as interpretive phenomenology.