The problem of Tolerance and Freedom of belief in John Rawls philosophy

Abstract

This article attempts to shed light on the issue of tolerance and freedom of belief in John Rawls philosophy, which he tackled in his liberal political theory, by answering central forms that are: How can a liberal, democratic, just and stable society be established despite the presence of doctrinal pluralism? To accomplish this task, we have methodically relied on the gains of the clssical liberal enlightening heritage as expressed by John Locke’s philosophy, which represented a direct theoretical depth of John Rawls’s philosophy. On this basis, one of the tasks of this study will be to place the concept in its theoretical and historical context. We will work on reformulating it by standing at the conceptuaal equipment that Rawls employed to justify his conception, such as: the freedom of thought and belief, Overlapping consensus, reasonable pluralism, equal liberty of Conscience, well- ordered society and public reason. Then we will move on to talk about the limits of this liberal conception of tolerance based on the “paradigm of recognition” and Will Kymlicka as a model.